Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks

(MsC Thesis 53 – 2008/2009)
Pedro da Silva Dias Rodrigues, nº52438

Coordination:
Carlos Nuno da Cruz Ribeiro, Assistant Professor, nº3499
Luís Manuel Antunes Veiga, Assistant Professor, nº4191

Master Degree in Information Systems and Computer Engineering - Alameda
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Instituto Superior Técnico – Universidade Técnica de Lisboa
Av. Rovisco Pais, 1
1049-001 Lisboa (Portugal)

Abstract. In the last few years, peer-to-peer systems became well known to the general public by allowing fast and simple exchange of resources between users. The complexity of these systems resides in the fact that each user can act both as a client and as a server and, due to the absence of a central authority, the need for self-regulation. There is also the need to guarantee that every user contributes to the system seeing that, if that isn’t ensured, the performance of the system will decay due to the disparity between demand and offer of resources.

This paper describes our work developing incentive mechanisms, which enable the correct operation of peer-to-peer systems, imposing a balance between demand for resources and the existing offer. All incentive mechanisms take into account the attacks these systems are subject to, as well as the system’s structure, so that they do not pose an unnecessary burden, slowing down the system excessively. We explore concepts such as reputation and currency, which are used in other systems and, most importantly, in our everyday life, enabling a coherent scheme to detect untrustworthy users and reward truthful peers with faster access to the resources.

Our work is part of a larger project called GINGER, an acronym for Grid In a Non-Grid Environment, a peer-to-peer infrastructure intended to ease the sharing of computer resources between users.

Keywords: Peer-to-Peer System, Incentive Mechanisms, Reputation, Currency, Sybil Attack, Computational Puzzles

1. Introduction

The exchange of information between users has always been the main purpose of any computer network. While P2P architectures have long been used in laboratories and company offices to share computational resources, these applications are yet to achieve widespread utilization, mainly due to the difficulty to effectively control user behavior. Our work aims to contribute to the faster dissemination of these networks, allowing ordinary users access outside controlled environments.

Our main concern is related to the overall fairness of the system, guaranteeing that vicious users will not be able to corrupt the entire system by not contributing to the resource pool or delivering false results. We developed an incentive schema taking into account these possible attacks to the system, already confirmed in other peer-to-peer networks, as well as every concern with the security of communications between users.

A central server is always a target for attacks and cause for failures; this is why decentralization is vital. But decentralizing also expands the complexity of the system, making difficult the task of identifying users in order to prevent abuse and attacks. In controlled environments it is possible to request user authentication via smartcards or biometric data because direct physical contact with the users happens. But in a scalable peer-to-peer network, users are geographically distributed and anonymous, hence the necessity to develop incentive mechanisms compatible with this network structure and capable of identifying attackers and prevent system collapse.

We will start by presenting a description of peer-to-peer systems and their main characteristics, using some of the most well known applications as examples. We also provide an overview of the framework upon which our development is made, the Pastry Overlay Network, as well as of the simulator used to analyze the effectiveness of our incentive mechanisms, PeerSim.

Section 3 encompasses information about relevant contributions to this field, both theoretical and practical, including examples of implementations of peer-to-peer systems designed with the same objectives in mind.
Following the discussion brought by different approaches to this problem, we present our solution in Section 4, highlighting major features and architectural decisions, detailed and broke down in Section 5.

We then proceed to simulate possible implementation scenarios and analyze the effectiveness of our solution from different viewpoints, plus considerations about the impact on performance. Finally, in Section 7, we present our conclusions and improvement possibilities.

2. Peer-to-Peer Architecture

The main characteristic that defines the P2P architecture is the ability the participants have to communicate with each other and share resources between them, acting as clients and servers, without the necessity for a central coordination entity.

A number of incentive mechanisms has been developed, according to immediate preoccupations and specific objectives. A categorization of reputation systems is presented in [13], and identifies three main components in these systems, namely: 1) information gathering, 2) scoring and ranking, and 3) response.

The main issues when considering effective incentive mechanisms applied to peer-to-peer networks, according to [8], are: Self-policing, which means that there is no central authority and that peers themselves must enforce existing policies; Anonymity of users; No profit for newcomers, so that users are not encouraged to change identity; Minimal overhead to the application; Robustness to malicious users, even if they collude to achieve advantage over other users.

Peer-to-peer systems have tried to minimize the risk of system disruption motivated by an attack to a central authority, enabling each user to make all necessary decisions and guaranteeing that the system remains in operation, even if most of the nodes fail. The downside is obvious: without a central authority, trust becomes a fundamental problem to deal with.

2.1. Successful Peer-to-Peer Systems

Designed and implemented in 2001, the BitTorrent protocol [2] is used to distribute large amount of data without requiring enormous resources from the hosts. To address the problem of users who only downloaded content without contributing to the sharing community, BitTorrent deployed basic incentive mechanisms to encourage resource sharing. However, these basic procedures, such as tit-for-tat [3], have proven to be fragile and inefficient [1, 16, 20].

Also developed in 2001, KaZaA [9] adopted a different strategy. The main difference between the BitTorrent protocol and the FastTrack protocol used in KaZaA is that not all peers are equal; there are Ordinary Nodes (ON) and Super Nodes (SN), with different responsibilities [12]. Super Nodes are not dedicated servers and the lifetime of a SN is no longer than a few hours, avoiding potential problems related to single points of failure. The idea is that nodes with higher resources can act as small servers to organize ON in groups and compile information about the resources being shared by ON assigned to them. KaZaA benefits from this architectural approach and shows that, even without central points of failure, structuring peer-to-peer networks is possible and can have a positive impact on reliability and performance, improving scalability.

Launched by the University of California in 1999, SETI@Home [19] is probably the most recognized application for P2P distributed computing, with over 5.2 million participants worldwide. In order to find intelligence outside our planet based on electromagnetic transmissions analysis, the Space Sciences Laboratory developed this application so that anyone connected to the Internet could donate spare CPU cycles from their personal computers to process data. Since the resources were being shared with no kind of payment and the users expect nothing in return, incentive mechanisms were not necessary. However, to guarantee the accuracy of the computations made, the same tranches of data were dispatched to multiple users and the results validated among them.

2.2. Pastry Overlay Network

The Pastry overlay [18] provides the basis for the development of various peer-to-peer systems, with purposes ranging from file sharing to naming systems. The network is structured as a ring of nodes, each node in Pastry having a unique 128-bit numeric identifier, known as nodeID, keeping a list of its neighbors and communicating the arrival or departure of nodes to the application running on the Pastry overlay.

The expected number of hops to propagate a message is $O(\log N)$, where $N$ is the number of nodes in the network but, using a proximity metric, such as the number of IP routing hops in the Internet, it is possible to improve the message’s route.
To enter the system, a new node only needs to know the address of a Pastry node, to which it sends a “join” message, becoming its neighbor. The failing or unannounced departure of nodes in the Pastry network is also easily detected and treated. A node is said to have departed when its neighbors are no longer able to contact it. At that point, a new node must be inserted into the routing table to replace the departed node and to maintain the table’s integrity.

To cope with malicious nodes, Pastry uses a random route to deliver a message to its destiny, instead of a deterministic routing scheme. Resorting to this mechanism, a series of messages sent from node A to node B would almost certainly use different routes, making it impossible for a malicious node to intercept these messages.

2.3. PeerSim

The PeerSim [15] application is a complex simulator, capable of reproducing the operation of a large P2P network, with several thousand users exchanging resources simultaneously, as well as constant arrival and departure of peers. The PeerSim simulator supports multiple configurations, the most important ones being the number of nodes in the network, the protocols used and the controls to monitor the state of the network. Varying the parameters, we can simulate the presence of malicious nodes in the network and evaluate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms used.

3. Related Work

3.1. Reputation and Currency

The currency in a resource exchange system can be as simple as in a barter economy, where resources are exchanged between users without any form of payment, the resources themselves being the currency. However, introducing currency translates into users being able to share resources even when they do not require any in return right away, accumulating currency for future use. Another aspect can be brought up: should every resource have the same value? Some resources are scarcer than others, and there are “rush hours”, when the resource pool is insufficient to cope with every request. This is the difference between a token economy, where a token equals a resource, and a currency economy, where the value of a resource fluctuates.

As we have pointed out, knowing which users one can trust is crucial and the most popular solution to address this problem is attributing reputation to each user. The reputation of an entity can be described as the result of the level of trust peers place on that entity.

The well-known website eBay [5] is probably the most notorious example. When you buy a product from another user you are asked to rate the seller according to the quality of the product, communication, packaging and delivery time. If a user receives good reviews, it adds to his reputation and he becomes a renowned seller, attracting more potential buyers. In [22], the authors present Credence, whose main purpose is to avoid contaminating the network with mislabeled or dangerous content, such as viruses, by encouraging peers to classify the resources obtained from other peers. This is accomplished by linking the reputation of every user not only to the quality of the resources it shares, but also to quality of its evaluation on other peers’ resources.

Pragmatically, a user can only trust itself and users he has interacted with. However, this is very limited, therefore a process of Reputation Distribution or Trust Distribution is necessary. In [6], authors develop and test a framework for propagating trust and distrust, changing the focus from the number of voters to relationships developed over time, much like in real world, where you trust the opinion of a long acquaintance more than that of ten strangers. The burden of the trust propagation mechanism must be taken into account when designing the system, so that its impact does not minimize the positive effects of having an incentive mechanism. The work in [17] presents a mechanism for lightweight and distributed trust propagation, with the intent of implementation in low capacity devices, such as mobile phones, also providing good insight on this subject.

3.2. Robustness and Security

Thinking about the robustness and security of a system leads to immediate considerations regarding the capacity to identify its users, but the main problem with electronic identities is that a physical user can create as many virtual identities as he wishes. Even if in a controlled environment access can be limited to the known terminal nodes and user identification can be achieved with a mandatory login, this cannot be applied in a distributed environment with anonymous users and no central regulating authority. There are also other threats to consider besides user identification, such as collusion between users to obtain advantages over other users and
bribery, where users pay for privileged access to resources. A cryptographic key infrastructure is essential to ensure accountability, being used by most security solutions to authenticate users.

The Sybil attack, as described by Douceur [4], consists in a single user operating multiple virtual identities to abuse his permission to access resources. With the ability to create multiple virtual identities, a user needs not to worry about sharing resources and reputation. Various attacks against computer systems, such as spam and denial of service, are conducted creating multiple virtual identities, the low cost of creating virtual identities being the major incentive for attackers.

Preventing Sybil attacks has been the motivation for countless works and [11] presents an interesting survey of how existing applications cope with the existence of such attacks. It shows that, although the attack is prominent, several applications are completely vulnerable and did not adopt adequate security mechanisms.

Collusion is also a major problem, be it a coalition between users or the use of multiple virtual identities for a single physical user. This attack can be used to improve each other’s reputation in the system, gaining the trust of other users and profiting from that situation.

In his PhD Thesis, Jesi [7] focused on techniques to avoid the possibility of system disruption by a group of coordinated attackers exploring frailties in the neighbor’s list propagation methods. In [14] authors develop a mechanism to prevent collusion based on peer auditing. The idea is to compel users to publish signed records of their actions, which can then be audited by other peers.

The robustness of the system can only be ensured if selfish and untrustworthy users, who do not contribute to the system and take advantage of other peers, are detected and banned. In [24], authors describe the design and implementation of a solution to identify fraudulent behavior from users in cycle sharing systems. This application focuses on situations where nodes make available only a part of the promised resources, namely using only a fraction of the computational power promised.

Users joining the network have no past interactions to prove their commitment to the system and therefore their reputation data is non-existent.

While a slow start can in fact be a solution and a guarantee that users really intend to contribute to the system, an adaptive solution based on the behavior of newcomers can prove to benefit the application [10]. The idea is to compile information on interactions with recently joining peers, determining if the system has a high rate of whitewashing, to decide how to cope with them.

To counter attempts of Sybil attack computational puzzles can be used. If every user has to solve a puzzle in order to enter the network, it creates a cost that not all attackers are comfortable with. Puzzles must be difficult to solve, requiring large amount of computation, but easy to verify.

One of the most straightforward solutions is presented in [23] and consists in reversing a cryptographic hash, given the original random input with a number of bits deleted. The challenge is very simple to create and verify but demands intense computation from the challenged node to perform a brute force attack in order to identify the deleted bits.

4. System Design

Our aim was always the balance between a currency and reputation-based system capable of delivering proper incentives to users, and the impact that system and all implemented security measures have on the network performance. These mechanisms are intended to work in a decentralized application, nevertheless we have arrived at the conclusion that a good incentive-based application must rely on both reputation and currency and, as a result, the existence of brokers presents several advantages, as the FastTrack protocol used in KaZaA demonstrated. The responsibility of being a broker should not become a massive burden to users, incapacitating them from producing useful computation and, to achieve this compromise, we had to restrict the number of users assigned to each broker.

In our solution, developed on top of the Pastry framework, the network is represented as a ring of peers connected to their immediate neighbors. We implemented virtual groups of users to structure the network, each group having an assigned broker. The groups are highly dynamic, but the number of users in one group is always kept inside defined thresholds, since a very large group would become almost impossible to manage and control by a single broker and, on the other hand, a group with a too small number of peers cannot satisfy those users needs. Additionally, the existence of brokers means that our architecture can be classified as partially hierarchical and structured.
To bootstrap the system, a small set of trustworthy users is needed, to act as super nodes. These users only need to reside in the system long enough for other users to be accurately classified as trustworthy. From that point on the brokers will be elected from the pool of peers, according to their reputation. In order for new users to enter the network they have to contact a user already in the system, meaning that some sort of contact outside the application is required.

After acceptance into the network, a new unique ID is created and assigned to the user, the broker responsible for that group contacts the new user, presenting its credentials, and send its neighbors list so that the new node can start contacting other peers.

The threshold for group sizes can be set accordingly to the computational capability of the broker or as a constant value, considered reasonable. When a group is growing and the size limit is about to be attained, the most reputed user should be appointed as the broker for a new group. Half of users, chosen randomly, are transferred to the new group.

When a group is not performing as expected, with the demand for resources far greater than the supply inside that group, either the group is dissolved and the users scattered among other groups, or the group is merged with another group. The second option is more effective, with the possibility of brokers exchanging information, conducting the stalled group towards a group with a large amount of unused resources.

4.1. Currency and Reputation

The brokers are the only users capable of introducing currency in the system and are responsible for registering an additional amount of currency to the most reputed users upon the entrance of a new peer. This prevents users entering a group from using all the initial currency and then exit the group giving nothing in exchange. Inversely, when users exit a group, the broker must make sure that the amount of currency in the group remains unchanged, guaranteeing that there is no shortage of currency and no illegitimate transfers of currency, allowing users to achieve and maintain a dominant position.

Currency and reputation are essential to the well functioning of the network and we have come to the conclusion that using both as two separate concepts is the most adequate manner to cope with all the problems presented. In a resource exchange, currency is passed from the buyer to the seller and, as a result, the seller becomes wealthier and the buyer poorer. But, if the transaction was carried out correctly, both users see their reputation rise, since every correct transaction is positive for the system. A user with little need for resources and who is a great contributor to the system will see the amount of currency in his possession rise indefinitely, and so a limit to the reputation is set to guarantee the balance of the system and the availability of resources, incentivizing collaboration.

The reputation of users is periodically adjusted downwards to promote activity and, additionally, when a broker records a bulk of transactions with the same buyer, that user also has his reputation decreased. We find this latter adjustment necessary to maintain the system’s throughput, since users with large amounts of currency can flood the network with requests, degrading the experience of other users.

4.2. Security

The most common option to provide security assurance against malicious users is to employ digital certificates, which identifies the entity signing the data, or cryptographic keys, symmetric or asymmetric, capable of guaranteeing integrity, authenticity and privacy of the data.

For the type of system we are considering, the digital certificate option does not seem appropriate, since it requires a trusted entity, a certificate authority, capable of validating these certificates, which is not present in a P2P network. The utilization of symmetric keys is more efficient, however it implies a way to share a key between two peers in a secure manner, consequently the use of asymmetric cryptography is more appropriate. The responsibility of creating the pair of cryptographic keys relies on each user and the size of the cryptographic keys is set as 512-bit for performance reasons, acceptable since the average time a user spends in the system is relatively low.

It is essential to the correct operation of the system that basic properties are guaranteed: Authenticity of Origin, so that there is no doubt on the identity of the sender; Non-Repudiation, forcing the sender to assume the authorship of the message; Integrity, to guarantee that the message was not adulterated.

Our currency allocation policy deals with the issue of users using initial funds to acquire resources without sharing, but attackers may also use their multiple identities to praise each other or criticize legitimate users, undermining the reputation system. The restrictions we implement regarding multiple transactions from the same user in a small time frame in addition to the certification of messages between users guarantee that it is not possible for attackers to tamper with their own reputation or to discredit legitimate users. It is also possible for
users to report malicious peers, allowing the brokers to fine them, as long as they present proof of that claim, namely signed messages to corroborate the accusation.

Even so, to protect the application from Sybil attacks we use computational puzzles, forcing users to perform a hash reversal. The complexity of the puzzles was adjusted so that legitimate users are able to access the network, while possible attackers have to deal with a heavy cost of entrance.

When a user joins the network, the only option to build up reputation and accumulate currency is providing resources to other users, but those reputed users will not be inclined to acquire resources from unknown peers, as the probability of defection is higher. We rely on the broker to maintain a record of recent transactions involving recently arrived users so that other peers can use that information to decide the best course of action.

5. Implementation Details

5.1. Interactions

To enter the network, a user must possess the address of a node that is already active and send a join request to that node. Since only Super Nodes can accept new members, any other nodes forward the request to the broker of the group they are in. The Super Node contacts the new node to convey its ID and also includes the cryptographic puzzle to be solved. The joining user becomes a member of the network only when the correct solution is sent back to the broker and verified.

When a user intends to acquire resources from other members of the application, he starts by selecting a neighbor in the same group and, if it is the first interaction with that peer, he can ask the broker for information about the reputation and the public cryptographic key. The request for resources and promise of delivery are cryptographically signed to guarantee authenticity and non-repudiation. After both parties confirm the exchange and notify the broker, the broker awards a reputation bonus to both users to reward their correct behavior.

If the peers already have information about each other from previous interactions, the broker needs only to get involved in this last step, with minimal impact on performance.

As a protection against collusion between peers and also to prevent abuse from peers with a dominant position, the broker stops awarding reputation if a possible attack is detected. Nodes are considered to be colluding if they have ten recorded transactions between them in the last 50, and a node stops receiving reputation points after ten exchanges as buyer, even with different neighbors.

An additional interaction with the broker may exist if one of the exchange participants has only recently arrived to the network. In this case, the broker is able to provide information about newcomers in the system, used to decide if the transaction continues with the selected neighbor.

To maintain the quality of resources in the system and accurately detect malicious users, it is possible to denounce peers if they fail to deliver the resources promised or deliver corrupt resources. The offended user can then contact the broker, using the signed messages exchanged with the malicious user as evidence to corroborate the claim. We provide a framework and leave the implementation of specific means to detect fraudulent behavior to the developers of applications using these incentive mechanisms, since these can vary immensely depending on the purpose and environment in which the application is run. To encourage users to report malicious peers, a bonus is awarded in case the claim is verified, besides the obvious penalty for the malicious user.

5.2. Computational Puzzles

Computational challenges based on intensive computation are one of the most efficient ways to combat Sybil attacks. Bearing in mind that both efficiency and complexity are vital variables, we opted by using Hash Reversal challenges. In this approach, a challenger produces a cryptographic hash and, after erasing $n$ bits from the input, sends that information to the challenged nodes so that they determine the complete original input, also called nounce, through brute force search and multiple hashing actions. The complexity of the computation can be easily adjusted by varying the parameter $n$. Both generation and verification are simple procedures, which guarantees that the Super Nodes will not be severely burdened.

The downside of using hash reversal challenges lies in the method of solving these challenges, which can be parallelized. Nevertheless, and as pointed out in [21], even parallelizable puzzles are effective against most attacks, with the advantage of simplicity in construction and verification.

We chose to use an alphanumeric nounce with a length of 512 bits, and defined $n$ as 40 bits. The elapsed time to solve the challenges averages 11 seconds according to simulations on a MacBook Pro laptop with an Intel Core 2 Duo processor running at 2.2GHz, with 4GB of DDR2 667MHz RAM. We consider this value reasonable for a legitimate node, since it is only performed once. However, for attackers wishing to deploy multiple

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Pedro da Silva Dias Rodrigues, nº52438
identities in the application, the required time is very high, even if the attacker has access to high-end technology and fast processors.

6. Simulation and Evaluation

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms developed, it is necessary to simulate network operation as close to reality as possible, including the presence of users who try to get an undeserved advantage over other users and we used PeerSim to accomplish that. We use the term faulty users to identify every member of the network who does not comply with established rules and aims to gain an advantage over other users exploiting weaknesses in the system.

Depending on the parameters we define for the simulation, these nodes might try to collude with each other so that their reputation and amount of resources rapidly increases, perform praising or badmouthing attacks to manipulate reputation measures, or carry out overbooking of resources making promises and then failing to deliver the resources.

Table 1 lists all relevant parameters passed to the simulator and a simple explanation for each one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Controls the duration of the simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Budget</td>
<td>Sets the initial currency amount, which limits the possibility of a node acquiring resources from a peer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Reputation</td>
<td>The initial reputation, which determines the number of faulty behaviors a user can have before being expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Group Size</td>
<td>The maximum number of nodes simultaneously on a group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Cost of a Resource</td>
<td>The variation on the average cost of acquiring resources has a direct impact on the number of exchanges a user can accomplish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Node Being Faulty</td>
<td>Adjusts the percentage of faulty nodes in the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Node Refusing to Provide Resources</td>
<td>Simulates a situation in which resources are scarce and therefore can be difficult to acquire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Node Being Added to the Network</td>
<td>These parameters are used to control the behavior of nodes in the system, increasing and decreasing the rate of entrance and abandoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Node Being Removed from the Network</td>
<td>The sum of these three probabilities must be 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Node Asking Other Peers for Resources</td>
<td>Parameters to adjust the behavior of faulty nodes, making them more or less aggressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of Faulty Node Making Fake Requests or Acceptances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Faulty Node performing Badmouthing or Praising Attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Faulty Node Colluding With Other Faulty Nodes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of a Node Optimistically Unchoking a New Peer</td>
<td>This parameter is used if a node chooses not to consult the broker to decide if newcomers are to be trusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Signatures</td>
<td>Enables or disables the use of cryptographic signatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of Super Nodes</td>
<td>Enables or disables the existence of super nodes and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressively Award Currency and Reputation</td>
<td>Enabling this option we can define a low initial budget, obliging nodes to share resources in order to accumulate currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic Reputation Adjustment</td>
<td>Periodically decreasing their reputation can force nodes to share resources, instead of just using accumulated currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collusion Detection</td>
<td>The broker of each group maintains a record of transactions to verify possible collusion between nodes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We decided to keep two of the parameters constant throughout the simulations, namely the number of cycles in each simulation and the initial reputation of each node. The penalties for incorrect behavior and awards for
successful exchanges are also stable so that the number of detected infractions needed to expel a node is the same in all simulations.

6.1. Simulation Results

In this section we present the results of our most relevant simulations, measure the effectiveness of our system and also the impact of all mechanisms in the performance. All the simulations were run on a MacBook Pro with an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.2GHz processor and 4GB of DDR2 667MHz RAM.

In the initial simulation, without any protection mechanisms or faulty nodes, we measure performance indicators to evaluate future impacts. The average results are summarized in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Nodes</th>
<th>2300</th>
<th>Reputation (Correct Nodes)</th>
<th>72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expelled Nodes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Budget (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Nodes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>8.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulty Nodes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Reputation (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Attempted</td>
<td>20040</td>
<td>Budget (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Failed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapsed Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Initial Simulation

Next, we intended to verify the consequences of a peer-to-peer application without any incentive mechanisms, where 10% of the nodes perform attacks in order to maximize their profits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Nodes</th>
<th>2249</th>
<th>Reputation (Correct Nodes)</th>
<th>72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expelled Nodes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Budget (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Nodes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>8.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulty Nodes</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>Reputation (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Attempted</td>
<td>21960</td>
<td>Budget (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Failed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>17.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapsed Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 – Inexistent Incentive Mechanisms

In the first simulation including Super Nodes, without multiple groups, we introduced message signing, the necessary infrastructure and operations. The objective is to verify the ability to detect attacks but also to measure the impact on performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Nodes</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>Reputation (Correct Nodes)</th>
<th>73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expelled Nodes</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>Budget (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Nodes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>8.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulty Nodes</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Reputation (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Attempted</td>
<td>20986</td>
<td>Budget (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Failed</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapsed Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>102 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 – Message Signing
We then proceeded to simulate the behavior of the network using all incentive mechanisms and the architecture we propose, based on groups, with a maximum of 500 users per group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Nodes</th>
<th>2036</th>
<th>Reputation (Correct Nodes)</th>
<th>60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expelled Nodes</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>Budget (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Nodes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Correct Nodes)</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faulty Nodes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Reputation (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Attempted</td>
<td>19294</td>
<td>Budget (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges Failed</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>Successful Exchanges (Faulty Nodes)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elapsed Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>108 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 – Full Incentive Mechanisms

6.2. Simulation Analysis

Analyzing the results from the various simulations, we can draw several conclusions. The most important is that the number of exchanges a legitimate user can achieve with our incentive mechanisms is very close to the ideal scenario, without malicious users, despite the higher elapsed time. The major reason for the decreased performance lies in the operations with cryptographic keys, with the other mechanisms having little or no influence. However, if we take into account that the effort will be divided among the peers, the impacts on performance do not seem severe.

The success of attacks from faulty nodes is greatly reduced when the incentive mechanisms are in place, reducing the throughput of malicious users from twice as much as the accomplished by legitimate nodes to just 11%. Guaranteeing that defective users were detected and could not have an advantage over legitimate ones was the main objective of this work, and we consider the results highly pleasing. It is worth mentioning that one of the incentive mechanisms, a small initial budget and progressive introduction of currency, results in a slow start even for honest users. For that reason, the number of successful transactions may appear to be weak but, as the number of interactions increases and time advances, that initial impact is softened.

7. Conclusion

With the intent to promote the sharing of computational resources in uncontrolled environments, the main objective of this thesis was the development of effective and reliable incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer applications. To achieve better results and a more balanced network, we decided to implement a solution based on multiple groups of users, with a 2-tier hierarchy – Super Nodes and Regular Nodes. This architecture guarantees scalability by dividing users into groups, which are easier to manage by the Super Nodes, whose responsibility is to oversee the behavior of nodes in the network, acting as a judge to disputes and enforcing all the defined policies.

Bearing in mind that the most prominent threat comes from the Sybil Attack, we resorted to a computational test based on hash reversal and based the entire system upon two different but related concepts: currency and reputation. The first one consists in a payment method, used in resource transactions, while reputation intends to symbolize if the user is reliable based on past interactions. The reputation of nodes becomes a central indicator for neighbors when choosing transaction partners, allowing them to overlook and avoid potential hazards and complications, which would delay their access to the resources needed.

We developed our incentive mechanisms on top of the Pastry overlay network, making it very easy to adapt to other applications already using the same framework, and hoping that, by resorting to a well-known structure, we can benefit the performance and widespread of these systems.

Each portion of our solution was tested individually and then as a whole using the Peersim simulator and fine tuned to achieve the best results possible. The many configurable parameters we could pass on to the simulation engine made possible complex and detailed simulations as well as the construction of diverse possible scenarios to replicate known attacks.
8. Future Work

We have established that the Super Nodes are responsible for guaranteeing the correct functioning of the system by identifying potential threats and making sure all nodes comply with the requirements. However, we have not yet defined the entity responsible for controlling the correct operation of the Super Nodes. The approach we consider to be more correct is to develop a way by which Super Nodes can judge one another and, when needed, achieve the necessary quorum to expel a malicious Super Node.

Mimicking a principle some countries apply in their political system, a limitation on mandates can also be set, which would mean that Super Nodes could only execute that post during a limited amount of time, being automatically substituted once their validity expired.

References

[19] Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI), http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/