

# Storing Critical Data in the Cloud: Challenges and Solutions

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# Clouds are complex so they fail

## Magnolia Suffers Major Data Loss, Site Taken Offline

Uncategorized

### Cloud computing takes hit in Sidekick data loss

Share |   

The "cloud" turned stormy as a major data loss occurred, wiping out personal data for millions of users.

Sign Up

Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life.

### More Details on Today's Outage

by Robert Johnson on Thursday, September 23, 2010 at 5:29pm



These faults can stop services, corrupt state and execution: Byzantine/malicious faults

Window

29 Feb 201

I lead the engineering organization responsible for the events that occurred with the Amazon outage. We are committed to prevent this sort of issue from happening again, and as with any significant security event, and as with any significant security event, we will be transparent with our customers.

## Stalked Teens, Spied on Chats (Updated)

We entrust Google with our most private communications because we assume the company takes every precaution to safeguard our data. It doesn't. A Google engineer spied on four underage teens for months before the

Now that we have fully restored functionality, we are committed to prevent this sort of issue from happening again, and as with any significant security event, we will be transparent with our customers.

A new lawsuit alleges that Google deliberately destroyed evidence.

## Google App Engine Downtime Notify

Message from discussion [App Engine Datastore Outage - May 25, 2010](#)

**App Engine Team** [View profile](#)

[More options](#)


May 25th Datastore Outage Post-mortem

Summary

On May 25th, App Engine's Datastore experienced a failure causing an unexpected read-only period while traffic moved to the secondary data center. The outage affected all App Engine applications using the

# Cloud-of-Clouds

- Consumer runs service on a **set of clouds** forming a **virtual cloud**, what we call a **cloud-of-clouds**
- Related to the notion of federation of clouds
  - **Federation of clouds** – a virtual cloud created by cloud providers; requires cooperation between providers
  - **Cloud-of-clouds** – an ad-hoc virtual cloud created by consumers; no cooperation between clouds needed



# Cloud-of-Clouds dependability+security

- There is **redundancy** and **diversity** between clouds
- so even if some clouds fail a **cloud-of-clouds** that implements **replication** can still guarantee:
  - **Availability** – if some stop, the others are still there
  - **Integrity** – if some corrupt data, data is still at the others
  - **Disaster-tolerance** – clouds can be geographically far
  - **No vendor lock-in** – several clouds anyway
- plus, although, not specific to cloud-of-clouds:
  - **Confidentiality** (from clouds) – encryption
  - **Confidentiality/integrity** (from users) – access control


# Outline

- DepSky – file storage in clouds-of-clouds
- SCFS – file system in clouds-of-clouds
- S-Audit – file integrity verifier
- SafeCloud-FS – file system in clouds-of-clouds


# **DEPSKY – FILE STORAGE IN CLOUDS- OF-CLOUDS**

# DepSky


- Client-side library for cloud-of-clouds storage
  - File storage, similar to Amazon S3: read/write files, etc.
- Uses storage cloud services (S3, etc.) as they are:
  - All code at the client
- Data is updatable
  - Requires Byzantine quorum replication protocols for consistency



# Write protocol




# Read protocol




File is fetched from other clouds if signature doesn't match the file

# DepSky-A: limitations



# DepSky-CA: combining erasure codes and secret sharing

Only for data, not metadata



Encrypted so data can't be read at a cloud!  
Only ~2x the size of storage, not 4x!


# Consistency proportionality

- The consistency provided by DepSky is the same as the base storage clouds
  - If the weakest consistency cloud provides **eventual consistency**, DepSky provides **eventual consistency**
  - If the weakest consistency cloud provides **regular storage**, DepSky provides **regular storage**
  - ...

# DepSky latency

100KB files, clients in PlanetLab nodes

DepSky's **read** latency is close to the cloud with the **best** latency



DepSky's **write** latency is close to the cloud with the **worst** latency

# DepSky perceived availability

- **perceived availability** = n. of files read / n. of read attempts
- impacted by the cloud and Internet availability

Location	Reads Tried	DEPSKY-A	DEPSKY-CA	Amazon S3	Rackspace	Azure	Nirvanix
Brazil	8428	1.0000	0.9998	1.0000	0.9997	0.9793	0.9986
US-PA	5113	1.0000	1.0000	0.9998	1.0000	1.0000	0.9880
US-CA	8084	1.0000	1.0000	0.9998	1.0000	1.0000	0.9996
New Zealand	8545	1.0000	1.0000	0.9998	1.0000	0.9542	0.9996
Japan	8392	1.0000	1.0000	0.9997	0.9998	0.9996	0.9997
China	8594	1.0000	1.0000	0.9997	1.0000	0.9994	1.0000
Spain	6550	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.9796	0.9995
UK	7069	1.0000	1.0000	0.9998	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

# **SCFS – FILE SYSTEM IN CLOUDS-OF-CLOUDS**

# Storage vs. File System (DepSky vs. SCFS)

- Storage (DepSky)


- API: simple operations over data blocks
- same consistency as clouds
- `create(id)`
- `read(fd)`
- `write(fd,block)`
- `delete(fd)`
- `lock(fd)`
- `unlock(fd)`
- `setACL(fd)`

- File system (SCFS)

- API: ~POSIX, so it's mounted and unmodified apps can use it (uses FUSE)
- strong consistency
- `open(path,flags)`
- `read(fd,buffer,length,offset)`
- `write(fd,buffer,length,offset)`
- `chmod(path,mode)`
- `mkdir(path,mode)`
- `flush, fsync, link, rmdir, symlink, chown,...`

# Shared Cloud-backed File System-SCFS

**Client-based:**  
Uses **existing**  
cloud storage  
services




**Pay-per ownership:**  
Each client **pays**  
for files it creates

**Strong Consistency**

**Controlled sharing:**  
**Access control** for  
security and concurrency

**Redundant  
Cloud Services**

# SCFS architecture



# Features

- Data layout/access pattern
  - Each file is an object (single-block file)
  - Multiple versions of the files are maintained
  - Always write, avoid reading (exploiting free writes)
- Caching
  - File cache: persistent (to avoid reading)
    - Local storage is used to hold copies of all client files (that fit)
    - Opened files are also maintained in main-memory
  - Metadata cache: short-lived, main-memory
    - To deal with bursts of *metadata* requests


# Features

- Consistency
  - Consistency-on-close semantics
    - when user closes a file, all updates he did become observable by the rest of the users
  - Locks to avoid write-write conflicts
- Modular coordination
  - Metadata is stored in a coordination service
    - e.g., Apache Zookeeper (crash fault-tolerant), our own DepSpace (Byzantine/intrusion-tolerant)
  - Also used for managing file locks
  - Separate data from metadata

# SCFS configurations


- SCFS can use different configurations/backends

## Intrusion-tolerant configuration (uses DepSky)



- Operation: **blocking**, non-blocking and non-sharing

# Sharing latency: SCFS vs DropBox



SCFS slightly better than Dropbox

Non-blocking

Blocking

Cloud-of-clouds doesn't increase latency Data Size

Blocking good for latency (in this sense)

# Benchmarking unmodified desktop applications

1.2 MB file



OpenOffice  
Writer


**Open Action:** 1 open(f,rw), 2 read(f), 3-5 open-write-close(lf1), 6-8 open-read-close(f), 9-11 open-read-close(lf1)

**Save Action:** 1-3 open-read-close(f), 4 close(f), 5-7 open-read-close(lf1), 8 delete(lf1), 9-11 open-write-close(lf2), 12-14 open-read-close(lf2), 15 truncate(f,0), 16-18 open-write-close(f), 19-21 open-fsync-close(f), 22-24 open-read-close(f), 25 open(f,rw)


**Close Action:** 1 close(f), 2-4 open-read-close(lf2), 5 delete(lf2)

55% } lock file ops; may be done locally  
40% }  
80% }

Lots of operations; doing this remotely...



Non-blocking




Blocking

Cloud-of-clouds per se doesn't increase latency much

Doing locks locally reduces much the latency

# **S-AUDIT – FILE INTEGRITY VERIFIER**

# Challenge: compromised cloud



- DepSky/SCFS: **file compromise** detected only they are downloaded → signatures don't match
- Is it ok to leave files unchecked for long periods?
- What is the cost of downloading all our files?

# S-Audit


- **Challenge:** how to check integrity without adversary being able to provide a fake proof?
  - Signatures don't work: cloud might store only the signatures, not the files
- **Solution: homomorphic digital signatures**
  - Computed in runtime
  - Adversary can't generate them without the files

# S-Audit

- First practical library to implement **homomorphic digital signatures**
  - Improves the Shacham Waters (SW) scheme
  - Smaller signatures by choosing a class of elliptic curves
- Actions: Setup, Sign, Verify


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
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
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
# S-Audit implementation

- Integrated with Amazon AWS and SCFS with DepSky library




# Storage costs

- What is the extra **storage cost** for storing a signature?
  - S-Audit: **half than SW**, but **double than RSA signatures**



# Cost tradeoff

- Storage cost is double, verification cost is less ~30%, so benefit depends on number of verifications per month



# **SAFECLOUD-FS – AN ENHANCED CLOUD-OF-CLOUDS FILE SYSTEM**

# SafeCloud-FS

- New implementation of the SCFS architecture
- DepSky for cloud-of-clouds storage
- DepSpace coordination service
  - Although we started exploring HomomorphicSpace
- S-Audit for integrity verification
- Client-side security mechanisms
  - User credential protection
  - Intrusion recovery

# WRAP-UP

# Conclusions

- **DepSky**: storage clouds-of-clouds
  - Availability, integrity, disaster-tolerance, no vendor lock-in, confidentiality
  - Faults in clouds + versions, so **Byzantine quorum system protocols**
  - Same consistency as the storage clouds
  - **Erasur codes** to reduce the size of data stored
  - **Secret sharing** to store cryptographic keys in clouds

# Conclusions

- **SCFS**: a cloud-backed file system
  - Similar guarantees to DepSky but **near-POSIX API**
  - Strong consistency provided by coordination service
  - Caching and careful design allows good performance
- **S-Audit**: file integrity verification
  - Uses an homomorphic digital signature scheme
- **SafeCloud-FS**: an enhanced cloud-backed file system

# Thank you

- Papers:
  - **DepSky: Dependable and Secure Storage in a Cloud-of-Clouds.**  
EuroSys 2010 / ACM Transactions on Storage, 2013
  - **SCFS: a Shared Cloud-backed File System.**  
Usenix Annual Technical Conference, 2014
  - **S-Audit: Efficient Data Integrity Verification for Cloud Storage.**  
IEEE TrustCom 2018
- Code:
  - <https://www.safecloud-project.eu/results/platform/ss3>  
(new version in a few days)