Blockchain Replication:

The Whys and The Hows Replicating Smart Contracts for Dependability

Miguel Pupo Correia

IFIP WG 10.4 83rd meeting – Melbourne January 2023





inesc-id.pt

Motivation: Cloud storage replication – DepSky

- Multi-cloud storage: client-side library that accesses clouds using a BFT quorum protocol
 - Benefit I: dependability even if f clouds fail
 - Benefit 2: enhance the dependability provided by individual clouds



Replication in a Blockchain

- Client accesses nodes that run a BFT consensus protocol (PoW, PoS, classical SMR, ...)
 - Benefit: a dependable system out of untrusted nodes



<u>many</u> nodes as nodes are not trustworthy in permissionless blockchains

Today: smart contract replication

- Client accesses different blockchains
- Contracts replicated in several blockchains instead of just one



- Benefit I: dependability even if f blockchains fail
- Benefit 2: enhance dependability provided by individual blockchains
- Benefit 3: allow using low(er) quality blockchains: Blockchain-of-Blockchains

Outline

- The problem
- Preliminaries
- V1: Register Contract Replication
- V2: Generalized Contract Replication
- Key takeaways

The problem

Permissionless Blockchains

• Bitcoin, Ethereum,...



Proof of Work (PoW)

 "If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains." (Nakamoto's Bitcoin whitepaper)

 What if a majority of CPU power is controlled by malicious nodes?

Chain reorganization / 51% attack

 Attacker creates new blocks at depths ("positions") already considered stable and manages to prune the original chain:



Byzantine failure: state of the system is modified!

Are these attacks possible?

- Not if the blockchain system is "huge", e.g., Bitcoin ~ 14 K nodes and more than 2×10^{20} hashes per second
- Possible with smaller blockchains:
 - Bitcoin Gold (Bitcoin hard fork 2017)
 - May 2018: ~18M USD double-spent; 76 nodes
 - Ethereum Classic (Ethereum hard fork 2016)
 - Jan. 2019: 15 reorganizations, ~IM USD double-spent; 532 nodes
- Proof-of-Stake:
 - Same problem in smaller blockchains, i.e., if the stakes are not high enough

Preliminaries

Today: Blockchain / contract replication

- Client accesses different blockchains
- Contracts replicated in several blockchains instead of just 1



Challenges for contract replication protocols

- Blockchains are distributed machines, not individual servers
- Blockchains can't be modified (only contracts can be added)
- Contracts can't communicate with contracts in other blockchains
- Contracts can't sign data
- Operations on contracts have weak finality
- Native cryptocurrencies have different prices
- Minor: interoperability, as Blockchains and contracts are heterogeneous
 - Solved considering single VM (e.g., EVM) and a client-side library

Parameters

• System-wide:

- \mathbf{n} number of blockchains used for replication: $B_1, B_2, \dots B_n$
- **f** maximum number of faulty blockchains (out of n)

• Blockchain-specific:

- a min. num. nodes to access for operation to be correct (a=1 if client trusts or runs the node)
- **d** min. depth for block to be final



a nodes accessed in each blockchain, waiting for depth to be >= **d**

Assumptions

- Blockchains: no more than **f** blockchains can be faulty
- Clients: always correct; follow the protocol and private keys are not disclosed
- Clients and nodes communicate through authenticated reliable channels
- Operation requests are authentic and non-repudiable (signed)
- Cryptographic schemes are trusted
- Contract starts created in all blockchains and in the same state

V1: Register Contract Replication

Simplifications of v1

- Constraints on the data stored in the contract:
- Data is self-verifiable
- Just reads and writes over individual registers
 - SC is as a multi-writer, multi-reader multi-register
 - Consensus number 1

Contract

- Contract that stores document data (for many docs)
 - Not the full documents (expensive)
- SC stores the following data for each document:
 - Doc ID
 - Doc authenticator (hash)
 doc-data
 - Other document metadata
 - Signer ID
 - Short Signature of doc-data
 - Version of the document

Protocol

• BFT quorum protocol

- Quorum set of subsets of blockchains, e.g., all sets of **n-f** blockchains
- Clients communicate with quorums of blockchains

• Basic primitive:

- Q-RPC(op, valid()) invokes operation op in replicas of the contract until
 - there are replies (rep) from a nodes, with depth at least d for each blockchain
 - that satisfy the predicate valid(rep)
 - for **n-f** blockchains

Protocol – write

• Write doc-data

- (1) Q-RPC read version of the doc-data stored; valid() checks the signature
 - Replicas return the highest version, using Signer ID to break ties
- (2) new-version = max{versions}+1 or 0 if none
- (3) Q-RPC write doc-data with version new-version
- The protocol ensures **n-f** blockchains store the latest version
 - For f=1 and n=2f+1=3 \rightarrow n-f=2 blockchains



Protocol – read

Read doc-data

- Q-RPC read version of the doc-data stored; valid() checks the signature
- return doc-data corresponding to max{versions}

The protocol ensures that

- candidate doc-data values come from **n-f** blockchains,
- which must intersect with the **n-f** in which it was written,
- so the version returned must be the most recent
- NB: the "value of the register" is that returned by read



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Consistency

- Consistency = Regular
 - a read concurrent with two or more writes returns any of the values being written or the previous value
 - $n \ge 2f+1$

Replicated register contract

• Data structure:

- Table (map) indexed by Doc ID (doc-id) and containing the data above

• Methods:

- Implement the SC functionality & the BFT quorum protocol
- registerDoc(doc-data, sign-data, version) write protocol
- getDoc(doc-id) returns doc-data, sign-data read protocol
- deleteDoc(doc-id) write protocol

V2: Generalized Contract Replication

Token contracts

Token – blockchain-based abstraction that can be owned

- Represents some asset: collectible, identity, resource,...
- Created and managed in contracts; structure usually standard:
 - ERC20 fungible tokens
 - ERC721 non-fungible tokens (NFCs)

• All have functions like:

- Balance of the contract
- Transfer token

Replicating tokens – challenges for v2

- Data is not self-verifiable
 - e.g., token balance is just a number
- Operations on multiple variables and not idempotent
 - consensus number > 1
- Replicating payments in cryptocurrencies
- Dealing with faulty clients

Data not self-verifiable

- Example variable is an integer (from ERC20):
 - balances[_to] += _value;
- Solution: modify protocol to not require self-verifiable data
- Read/write protocols & Q-RPC similar with:
 - n >= 3f+1 and the result is the most voted
 - Quorum intersections must have at least 2f+1
 blockchains, so that a majority is correct



Operations on multiple variables: problem

• Example from ERC20:

- Moves value tokens from caller's account to account to; returns a Boolean (success yes/no)

```
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) ... {
    ...
    balances[msg.sender] -= _value;
    balances[_to] += _value;
    ...
    return true;
}
```

Ops on multiple variables: solution

- Accept that replicas (updated with Q-RPC) will converge later
- CCRDTs Computation Conflict-free Replicated Data Types
 - Data types that allow operations over updates (e.g., integer inc./dec.) +
 - Replicas converge to the same result when all operations are applied
- We model the contract state as a CCRDT

Ops on multiple variables: CCRDT

- Contract state modeled as a single multi-register
 - There is a single version number used for reads/writes
 - All write/update operations are stored on a queue
 - All operations are executed when received
- Data type = multi-register composed of registers of:
 - Numeric types with a single operation: addition
 - Addition is commutative => two sequences of the same additions over the same initial value give the same result, independently of the order
 - Numeric or non-numeric types with single operation: assignation

Ops on multiple variables: inconsistencies

• Clients access n-f replicas => (temporary) inconsistencies:



- Owner periodically sends missing operations to the replicas
 - QueueCleanUp protocol: gets queued ops from replicas and updates

Dealing with faulty clients

• Owner

- Substitute it by a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)
- i.e., a contract in which actions are decided cooperatively, e.g., by voting
- Other clients (e.g., buyers):
 - Owner or DAO uses queues returned obtained by the QueueCleanUp protocol to detect faulty clients
 - e.g., that write different values in different replicas
 - Q-RPC to function BlockClients to add faulty clients to a blacklist

Key takeaways

Key takeaways

- A first shot at replicating contracts in different Blockchains
 - To increase dependability and/or allow using smaller Blockchains
- Challenges
 - Many: limited server-side code, not possible to modify blockchains, contracts can't communicate or sign, ...

Key technical contributions

- Fitting Byzantine quorum protocols in the constraints of Blockchain / SCs
- Combination of Byzantine quorum protocols with CCRDTs

Thank you

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